That’s It!

We’re pleased to announce that Stephan’s paper “That’s It! Hyperintensional Total Logic” has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Philosophical Logic.

Abstract: Call a truth complete with respect to a subject matter if it entails every truth about that subject matter. One attractive way to formulate a complete truth is to state all the relevant positive truths, and then add: and that’s it. When the subject matters under consideration are non-contingent, a non-trivial conception of completeness must invoke
a hyperintensional conception of entailment, and of the completion operation denoted by ‘that’s it’. This paper develops two complementary hyperintensional conceptions of completion using the framework of truthmaker semantics and determines the resulting logics of totality.

A penultimate version can be downloaded here, but the final version will be available open access soon.

Publication Success!

We’re pleased to announce that Nils’ paper “Imagining in Oppressive Contexts, or ‘What’s Wrong with Blacking Up?’”, co-written with Robin Zheng, is now forthcoming in Ethics. The paper investigates the moral permissibility of merely fictive imaginings—roughly, imaginings carried out ‘just for fun’—that deploy unethical attitudes. It articulates three ways that such imaginings can be oppressive. Pre-print here.

New publication

We are very happy that Stephan’s paper “Mighty Belief Revision” has been accepted for publication by The Journal of Philosophical Logic. The paper develops and defends a hyperintensional theory of belief revision based on truthmaker semantics. Penultimate version available here.

Workshop on Hyperintensional Formal Epistemology

We are holding a hybrid, two-day event on hyperintensional approaches in formal epistemology. The workshop is a satellite event, following the GAP.11 conference. It takes place in Berlin on September 16-17, 2022. Confimed speakers are Sena Bozdag, Johannes Korbmacher, Karolina Krzyżanowska, Hannes Leitgeb, Aybüke Özgün, and Timothy Williamson. For more information, including on how to register, please click here.

Another one

We’re once more delighted to report upon a publication success. Stefan’s paper “In Defence of Explanatory Realism” has been accepted for publication in Synthese. Link to the (open access) paper to follow as soon as it is available. As the title would suggest, the paper defends Explanatory Realism — here understood as the view that all explanations provide information about causes, grounds, or other forms of determination — against recent criticism.

Publication Successes

We’re delighted to report on two new publications!

Martin’s paper ‘Maybe Some Other Time’ has been accepted for publication by the Australasian Journal of Philosophy! In this paper, Martin develops a puzzle whose resolution requires us to recognize an unfamiliar distinction between two forms of metaphysical modality, each bearing a different relationship to time. A penultimate version is available for download here.

Singa’s paper ‘No Normative Free Lunch: Relevance and the Autonomy of the Normative Domain’ has been accepted for publication in Synthese! In this paper, Singa develops a ground-theoretic explication of the abstract autonomy claim according to which we cannot get normative statements from purely descriptive statements. The relevant autonomy thesis, formally explicated within the framework of truthmaker semantics, states that no normative proposition is fully grounded in a collection of exclusively descriptive propositions in a normatively relevant way. A penultimate version will be available for download soon.


I am delighted to report that I’ve had a paper accepted by Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. It is called ‘Singular Troubles with Singleton Socrates’, and it develops a modification of Fine’s truthmaker semantics in order to make it consistent with what I argue to be a very natural view of the structure of the grounds of the existence of the singleton set of Socrates (or anybody, indeed anything, else). A penultimate version is available here.