New publication

We are very happy that Stephan’s paper “Mighty Belief Revision” has been accepted for publication by The Journal of Philosophical Logic. The paper develops and defends a hyperintensional theory of belief revision based on truthmaker semantics. Penultimate version available here.


Workshop on Hyperintensional Formal Epistemology

We are holding a two-day event on hyperintensional approaches in formal epistemology. The workshop is a satellite event, following the GAP.11 conference. It takes place in Berlin on September 16-17, 2022. Confimed speakers are Sena Bozdag, Johannes Korbmacher, Karolina Krzyżanowska, Hannes Leitgeb, Aybüke Özgün, and Timothy Williamson. For more information, including a Call for Papers, click here.

Another one

We’re once more delighted to report upon a publication success. Stefan’s paper “In Defence of Explanatory Realism” has been accepted for publication in Synthese. Link to the (open access) paper to follow as soon as it is available. As the title would suggest, the paper defends Explanatory Realism — here understood as the view that all explanations provide information about causes, grounds, or other forms of determination — against recent criticism.

Publication Successes

We’re delighted to report on two new publications!

Martin’s paper ‘Maybe Some Other Time’ has been accepted for publication by the Australasian Journal of Philosophy! In this paper, Martin develops a puzzle whose resolution requires us to recognize an unfamiliar distinction between two forms of metaphysical modality, each bearing a different relationship to time. A penultimate version is available for download here.

Singa’s paper ‘No Normative Free Lunch: Relevance and the Autonomy of the Normative Domain’ has been accepted for publication in Synthese! In this paper, Singa develops a ground-theoretic explication of the abstract autonomy claim according to which we cannot get normative statements from purely descriptive statements. The relevant autonomy thesis, formally explicated within the framework of truthmaker semantics, states that no normative proposition is fully grounded in a collection of exclusively descriptive propositions in a normatively relevant way. A penultimate version will be available for download soon.

Conference on Difference-Making and Explanatory Relevance

We are delighted to announce a conference on difference-making and explanatory relevance, to take place via Zoom from July 12 to July 16. Invited speakers are Laura Franklin-Hall (NYU), Carolina Sartorio (Arizona), Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers), Michael Strevens (NYU), and Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (Bern). There are five slots open for contributed papers. For details, please have a look at the conference-website here.

New paper

I am very happy to report that I’ve got a paper forthcoming at Philosophical Studies. It examines the idea that grounding explanations can be accounted for by the counterfactual theory of explanation and eventually argues that they can’t. A penultimate version is here.