Hyperintensional Formal Epistemology

We are holding a two-day conference on hyperintensional approaches in formal epistemology. The event takes place on September 16-17, 2022 in Berlin, as a satellite event of the GAP.11 conference that runs from September 12-15, 2022.

Confirmed speakers:

  • Sena Bozdag (LMU Munich, MCMP)
  • Johannes Korbmacher (Utrecht University)
  • Karolina Krzyżanowska (University of Amsterdam, ILLC)
  • Hannes Leitgeb (LMU Munich, MCMP)
  • Aybüke Özgün (University of Amsterdam, ILLC)
  • Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford)

Titles and abstracts will follow in due course.

Call for Papers

Two slots (70 minutes, divided into 45-50 minutes for the talk and the remainder for discussion) are available for contributed papers on the topic of the conference. If you would like to present a paper, please submit a CV and an extended abstract of up to 2,000 words, suitable for anonymous review, to hamburgrelevance (at) gmail (dot) com by the deadline of 31 May, 2022. Notifications of acceptance will be sent out by 15 June, 2022. We will cover costs for accommodation and (at least) European travel. Submissions by graduate students and early career postdocs are especially welcome. We are planning to publish selected papers in a special issue of an international peer reviewed journal.

Topic

Hyperintensional theories of content have recently received a great deal of attention. Influential accounts include Fine’s truthmaker semantics, Leitgeb’s HYPE framework, and two-component approaches inspired by Yablo’s work, modelling meanings as pairs of truth-conditions and subject matters. This workshop examines applications of hyperintensional frameworks in formal epistemology. On the one hand, the case for hyperintensionality seems especially forceful here, since intensional approaches notoriously face problems of logical omniscience: taking belief, knowledge, etc. to be closed under logical consequence, they seem adequate at most to highly idealized thinkers. On the other hand, without idealizing assumptions about the agents under consideration, there may not be enough structure to knowledge and belief to enable fruitful systematic theorizing.

Possible topics for submissions include, but are not limited to:

  • development or discussion of specific hyperintensional approaches in formal epistemology
  • reasons for and against hyperintensionalism in formal epistemology
  • reasons for idealization in formal epistemology and the appropriate extent or degree of idealization